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Note 
 
Ensuring Equal Access: Rethinking Enforcement 
of Medicaid’s Equal Access Provision 
Anne M. Dwyer* 
In the summer of 2009, fifty-three-year-old Carol Vliet’s 
cancer returned with renewed ferocity.1 With tumors metasta-
sizing in her brain, liver, kidneys, and throat, she began yet 
another punishing regimen of chemotherapy and radiation.2 
Her world crumbling around her, she managed to find a small 
measure of comfort in her monthly visits with her long-time 
primary care doctor.3 However, this sense of security quickly 
vanished when her doctor informed her that he would no longer 
be able to see her.4 Her Medicaid insurance paid him so little 
that he could no longer afford to maintain her as a patient.5
Unfortunately, Carol Vliet’s story is an all too common ex-
perience for Medicaid patients across the country.
 
6
 
*  J.D. and M.P.H. Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School 
and University of Minnesota School of Public Health. Thank you to Professor 
Amy Monahan for her insight and guidance. Sincere thanks to my parents, 
Charlene Dwyer, for helping me become a better writer and a better person 
and John Dwyer, for giving me the confidence to take on any challenge. Spe-
cial thanks to Corey Hade for his steadfast support and encouragement over 
the past four years. Copyright © 2013 by Anne M. Dwyer. 
 With the 
poor economy fueling explosive growth in Medicaid enrollment 
coupled with significant state budget shortfalls, Medicaid pro-
vider payments have become a primary target of many budget-
 1. Kevin Sack, As Medicaid Payments Shrink, Patients Are Abandoned, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/health/policy/ 
16medicaid.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. (stating reimbursements from Medicaid were so low that Carol 
Vliet’s doctor was losing money every time a patient walked in his exam 
room).  
 6. See, e.g., id. (trying to find a physician for their two-year-old son, one 
parent felt like a “second-class citizen[]” after multiple doctors refused to ac-
cept their Medicaid insurance).  
  
2013] ENSURING EQUAL ACCESS 2321 
 
cutting measures.7 Under the equal access provision of the 
Medicaid Act, states are to consider the impact that provider 
rate changes will have on access to care.8 Specifically, the pro-
vision requires that payments for covered care and services 
“are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care 
and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and 
services are available under the plan at least to the extent that 
such care and services are available to the general population 
in the geographic area.”9
Nevertheless, many states lower provider payment rates to 
trim state budgets without analyzing the impact payment cuts 
may have on the number of providers willing to accept patients 
with Medicaid.
 
10 As a result of reduced provider reimbursement 
rates, the care and services available to Medicaid beneficiaries 
is often not the same as the care and services available to the 
general population.11 This has left many of the sixty million 
Americans who rely on Medicaid without access to needed 
care.12
 
 7. See id.; see also NICHOLAS JOHNSON ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY 
PRIORITIES, AN UPDATE ON STATE BUDGET CUTS: AT LEAST 46 STATES HAVE 
IMPOSED CUTS THAT HURT VULNERABLE RESIDENTS AND CAUSE JOB LOSS 9 
(2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1214 
(finding that twenty-two states have enacted cuts in Medicaid and the Chil-
dren’s Health Insurance Program, including reduced or frozen reimburse-
ments to health care providers). 
 
 8. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2006) (“A State plan for medical as-
sistance must . . . provide such methods and procedures . . . to assure that 
payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are 
sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available 
under the plan . . . .”). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See, e.g., Sack, supra note 1 (explaining that in 2009 Michigan cut 
provider payments by an additional 8% to help close a large budget shortfall 
leading to a reduction in participating providers). 
 11. See, e.g., Sandra L. Decker, In 2011 Nearly One-Third of Physicians 
Said They Would Not Accept New Medicaid Patients, but Rising Fees May 
Help, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1673, 1675 (2012) (finding that 31% of physicians were 
unwilling to accept any new Medicaid patients compared to 17% unwilling to 
accept new Medicare patients and 18% unwilling to accept new privately in-
sured patients). One patient commented on her state-issued Medicaid insur-
ance card, “It’s a useless piece of plastic. I can’t find an orthopedic surgeon or a 
pain management doctor who will accept Medicaid.” Robert Pear, Cuts Leave 
Patients with Medicaid Cards, but No Specialist to See, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/health/policy/02medicaid.html. 
 12. See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED, KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., THE MEDICAID PROGRAM AT A GLANCE 1, 2 (2012), available at http:// 
www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7235-05.pdf [hereinafter MEDICAID PROGRAM AT 
A GLANCE] (“Medicaid, the largest public health insurance program in the 
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Traditionally, Medicaid beneficiaries and providers have 
relied on the courts to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision 
and prevent harsh provider rate cuts.13 However, a number of 
factors—including inconsistent circuit rulings interpreting the 
legal requirements of Medicaid’s equal access provision, incon-
sistent court rulings concerning whether Medicaid beneficiaries 
or providers are able to bring an equal access suit, and a num-
ber of other pragmatic and ethical considerations—have made 
it increasingly difficult and impractical to employ judicial en-
forcement measures to ensure equal access.14
This Note argues that because the current judicial en-
forcement mechanism is unable to adequately address equal 
access violations, the federal government must implement an 
alternative enforcement mechanism to ensure equal access to 
care for Medicaid beneficiaries. Part I provides a brief overview 
of the Medicaid program and the evolution of the judicial en-
forcement of Medicaid’s equal access provision. Part II explores 
why the current judicial enforcement mechanism is unable to 
adequately address these violations. Part III recommends im-
plementation of a federal regulatory enforcement approach 
supported by adequate financial assistance as an alternative 
means to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision. This Note 
concludes that a robust federal regulatory scheme is an essen-
tial component of a Medicaid system that ensures access to 
providers consistent with Medicaid’s equal access provision. 
 
 
United States, covers over 60 million low-income individuals—roughly 1 in 
every 5 Americans.”); see also Edward C. Wang et al., Inequality of Access to 
Surgical Specialty Health Care: Why Children with Government-Funded In-
surance Have Less Access than Those with Private Insurance in Southern Cali-
fornia, 114 PEDIATRICS e584, e584 (2004), available at http://pediatrics 
.aappublications.org/content/114/5/e584.full.html (finding that ninety-seven 
surgeons would offer an office appointment to a child with commercial insur-
ance compared to only twenty-seven surgeons for a child with Medi-Cal; rea-
sons for not offering an office appointment or surgery for a child with Medi-Cal 
included low monetary reimbursement); Pear, supra note 11 (“I have tried for 
more than a year to find a child psychiatrist or psychologist to get [my son] 
evaluated, but the mental health professionals in this area have told me they 
absolutely do not take Medicaid.”). 
 13. See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Comment, Payments to Medicaid Doctors: 
Interpreting the “Equal Access” Provision, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 673, 677 (2006) 
(explaining that in attempts to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision, 
“providers and patients have sued state health agencies, claiming that state-
set rates are legally insufficient”). 
 14. See infra Part II. 
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I.  MEDICAID’S EQUAL ACCESS PROVISION   
Medicaid’s equal access provision operates within the larg-
er framework of the Medicaid program. Accordingly, this Part 
first provides a brief overview of the development and structure 
of the Medicaid program. It then examines Medicaid’s provider 
payment policy, its effects on provider participation, and the 
role of Medicaid’s equal access provision in ensuring access to 
care. Finally, this Part explores the evolution of judicial en-
forcement of Medicaid’s equal access provision. 
A. THE MEDICAID PROGRAM 
Prior to enactment of the Medicaid Act in 1965,15 America 
had a two-tiered, income-based healthcare system. Wealthy 
Americans in the top tier were cared for by private providers 
while the nation’s poor occupied the bottom tier where their ac-
cess to care was limited to emergency rooms and charitable 
hospitals.16
Codified as Title XIX of the Social Security Act,
  
17 the Medi-
caid Act was intended to address America’s separate and une-
qual two-tiered health care system by providing passage for 
many of the nation’s poor and disabled into the upper tier of the 
health care system.18 As a result, the creation of the Medicaid 
program represented a fundamental philosophical shift in how 
the government viewed its role in caring for the health of the 
poor and disabled.19 It significantly expanded the government’s 
role in financing health care and codified access by medically 
indigent persons to “mainstream” medical care.20
 
 15. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1396 (2006)). 
 At present, 
the four main categories of low-income individuals covered by 
the Medicaid program are children and their caretakers, preg-
 16. Rosemary B. Guiltinan, Note, Enforcing a Critical Entitlement: 
Preemption Claims as an Alternative Way to Protect Medicaid Recipients’ Ac-
cess to Healthcare, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1583, 1590 (2010); Moncrieff, supra note 13, 
at 675. 
 17. 79 Stat. 343. 
 18. Moncrieff, supra note 13, at 675 (citing Medicare and Medicaid: Hear-
ings Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 91st Cong. 57 (1970) (statement of Hon. 
John G. Veneman, Under Secretary, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare)). 
 19. Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Mean-
ing in a Post-Deficit Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 9 
(2006). 
 20. Id. 
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nant women, people with disabilities, and the elderly.21 In addi-
tion, under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
states have the option of extending Medicaid coverage to indi-
viduals not presently eligible for the program, including child-
less adults.22 As a result, Medicaid enrollment is expected to in-
crease by four to fifteen million between 2012 and 2021.23
Medicaid is structured as a cooperative federal-state pro-
gram in which the federal government provides partial finan-
cial assistance to states so that they may furnish health care to 
low-income individuals.
 
24 In order to participate in the Medi-
caid program and receive federal matching funds, a state must 
have a Medicaid plan that is approved by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services (HHS).25 The state plan must de-
scribe the scope and nature of the state’s Medicaid program 
and comply with the requirements of the Medicaid Act.26 As one 
of the federal government’s grant-in-aid programs, enacted un-
der Congress’s Spending Clause powers, a state’s receipt of fed-
eral Medicaid funds is conditioned on compliance with federal 
requirements.27 If a state wishes to change the way its Medi-
caid program is administered, it must submit a state plan 
amendment for a determination as to whether the proposed 
change complies with federal requirements.28 If the federal gov-
ernment finds that the plan does not comply with the Medicaid 
Act, the Secretary of HHS has the authority to abolish the 
state’s federal Medicaid funding.29
 
 21. Guiltinan, supra note 
 
16, at 1590 (“Income, immigration, and residen-
cy restrictions must also be met.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2006). 
 22. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 2001, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (expanding Medicaid eligibility to individuals 
with incomes at or below 133% of the federal poverty level). 
 23. DELOITTE, ISSUE BRIEF: STATE MEDICAID PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
UPDATE AND CONSIDERATIONS 4 (2012), available at http://www.deloitte.com/ 
assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Health%20Reform% 
20Issues%20Briefs/us_chs_2012StateMedicaidProgramManagement_092012 
.pdf. 
 24. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990) (discussing the 
structure and functions of the Medicaid program). 
 25. ANDY SCHNEIDER ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED, 
THE MEDICAID RESOURCE BOOK 136 (2002), available at http://www.kff.org/ 
medicaid/2236-index.cfm. 
 26. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1590.  
 27. Rosenbaum, supra note 19, at 10; see also SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra 
note 25, at 134 (“There are 63 separate federal statutory requirements that 
state Medicaid plans must meet.”).  
 28. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 136. 
 29. Id. 
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Although state participation in the Medicaid program is 
entirely voluntary, every state has chosen to participate.30 Un-
der the Medicaid Act, states are given responsibility for admin-
istering the program on a day-to-day basis within broad re-
quirements set by the federal government.31 Within these broad 
federal guidelines, states maintain a large degree of flexibility 
in operating the program, including determining eligibility re-
quirements, establishing the scope of covered benefits, and set-
ting rates for provider reimbursement.32 As a result of this flex-
ibility, each state has a separate and distinct Medicaid program 
with significantly different eligibility, benefits, and provider 
payment policies.33
B. MEDICAID PROVIDER PAYMENT POLICY 
 
State Medicaid programs vary widely; however, a basic 
commonality among them is their reliance on the private sector 
to provide care for Medicaid beneficiaries.34 In procuring access 
to care, each state Medicaid program typically interacts with 
private providers in one of two ways.35 Under a fee-for-service 
approach, the state acts as a third-party payer and purchases 
private-market health care on behalf of Medicaid beneficiar-
ies.36 Alternatively, under a managed care approach, the state 
contracts with private managed care organizations on a capi-
tated rate basis37 to provide care to Medicaid participants.38 
States generally have flexibility to decide whether to buy cov-
ered services on a fee-for-service or managed care basis.39
 
 30. Id. at 130. 
  
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Moncrieff, supra note 13, at 676. 
 35. The term “providers” includes individual physicians, hospitals, nurs-
ing homes, dentists, and non-physician health practitioners including nurses 
and psychologists. Id. at 674 n.8. 
 36. Id. at 676; SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 141. 
 37. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 102 (describing how fee-for-
service rates are influential in setting capitation rates). Under a capitated 
payment system, a “physician, hospital, or other health care provider is paid a 
set rate for each member . . . regardless of the number or nature of services 
provided.” FREE DICTIONARY, http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/ 
capitation (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
 38. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 141–42 (describing rates pay-
able to managed care organizations); Moncrieff, supra note 13, at 676 (stating 
that Medicaid “pays private managed care organizations (MCOs) to provide 
both insurance and services to Medicaid patients”). 
 39. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 141. 
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States also have broad discretion in setting Medicaid pro-
vider payment rates.40 Federal regulations impose upper limits 
on the amount state Medicaid programs can pay for certain in-
stitutional services as well as outpatient hospital and clinical 
services.41 There are, however, no federal requirements control-
ling floors on Medicaid payment rates to physicians and other 
individual providers.42
Originally, a provision of the Medicaid Act referred to as 
the Boren Amendment governed states’ Medicaid payments to 
certain institutional care facilities.
  
43 Payments to these provid-
ers had to be sufficient to cover the cost of “efficiently and eco-
nomically operated facilities.”44 However, in 1997 the Boren 
Amendment was repealed leaving no federal floor governing 
payment rates to institutional providers.45 As a result, Medicaid 
payment methodologies and levels vary considerably by state.46 
Nevertheless, the Medicaid Act does, through its equal access 
provisions, indirectly constrain states’ otherwise broad discre-
tion to set Medicaid reimbursement rates.47
Provider participation in the Medicaid program is option-
al.
  
48
 
 40. Id. 
 There are a variety of factors that influence provider par-
ticipation in the Medicaid program, including “the administra-
tive burden of billing Medicaid, delays in payment, capacity 
 41. Id. The institutional services include “inpatient hospital, nursing facil-
ities, and intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded.” Id.; see also 
42 C.F.R. § 447.1–.56 (2011).  
 42. However, two groups of fee-for-service providers are protected by 
payment floors: federally-qualified health centers and hospice facilities. 
SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 141.  
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1994) (repealed 1997). 
 44. Id.  
 45. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 141.  
 46. See DEBORAH BACHRACH, CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, PAY-
MENT REFORM: CREATING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE FOR MEDICAID 2 (2010), 
available at http://www.chcs.org/usr_doc/Medicaid_Payment_Reform_Brief 
.pdf. 
 47. Citing separate access review procedures set forth in Part 438 of the 
Code of the Federal Regulations, the federal government takes the position 
that this provision does not apply to managed care arrangements. See Medi-
caid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76 
Fed. Reg. 26,342, 25,343 (proposed May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 
447). 
 48. Sean Jessee, Comment, Fulfilling the Promise of the Medicaid Act: 
Why the Equal Access Clause Creates Privately Enforceable Rights, 58 EMORY 
L.J. 791, 796–98 (2009). 
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constraints, and high clinical burdens.”49 However, one of the 
most commonly cited reasons for refraining from participation 
in the Medicaid program is inadequate reimbursement.50 If 
providers are able to fill their schedules with higher-
reimbursing privately insured patients, then they have no fi-
nancial incentive to take Medicaid patients. Accordingly, be-
cause states rely on private providers to furnish care to Medi-
caid beneficiaries, ensuring that states adequately reimburse 
providers is essential to ensuring that a sufficient number of 
providers enroll in and accept patients from the Medicaid pro-
gram.51
Acknowledging the importance of provider participation in 
the Medicaid program, in 1989 Congress amended the Medicaid 
Act in response to attempts by states to restrain provider pay-
ment rates as a way of controlling program costs.
  
52
 
 49. MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CON-
GRESS ON MEDICAID AND CHIP 132 (2011), available at http://healthreform.kff 
.org/~/media/Files/KHS/docfinder/MACPAC_March2011_web.pdf [hereinafter 
MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT]; see also Steve Berman et al., Factors that Influ-
ence the Willingness of Private Primary Care Pediatricians to Accept More 
Medicaid Patients, 110 PEDIATRICS 239, 243 (2002) (finding that states with 
higher average concerns about Medicaid paperwork had lower pediatrician 
provider participation rates); Peter J. Cunningham & Ann S. O’Malley, Do Re-
imbursement Delays Discourage Medicaid Participation by Physicians?, 28 
HEALTH AFF. w17, w17 (2009) (finding that payment delays and administra-
tive burdens affect provider participation in Medicaid).  
 With the 
enactment of the equal access provision, states were required to 
reimburse providers at a level that promoted efficiency and 
 50. See Wang et al., supra note 12, at e586 (finding that among surgeons 
surveyed, 92% cited low monetary reimbursement for surgery as a reason for 
not offering surgery for children with Medi-Cal); see also Berman et al., supra 
note 49, at 244 (finding that low payment rates relate to low Medicaid partici-
pating by primary care office-based pediatricians); Decker, supra note 11, at 
1676 (finding that acceptance rates of new Medicaid patients were higher in 
states with higher Medicaid-to-Medicare fee ratios).  
 51. See Wang et al., supra note 12, at e586 (describing how surgeons re-
fused to take Medi-Cal patients based on low reimbursement rates). 
 52. A Congressional Report issued by the House Committee on the Budget 
noted, “As the National Governors’ Association testified before the Subcommit-
tee on Health and the Environment . . . ‘States have restrained physician fees 
as one method of controlling program costs.’” H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 390 
(1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2116. As a result, the report con-
cluded that although “the Committee recognizes that payment levels are only 
one determinant of physician participation . . . the Committee believes that, 
without adequate payment levels, it is simply unrealistic to expect physicians 
to participate in the program.” Id. 
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economy but also ensured quality of care and sufficient provid-
er participation.53
Nonetheless, many states reduce provider reimbursement 
rates in an attempt to cut Medicaid costs and decrease state 
budget deficits.
  
54 Insufficient provider reimbursement rates 
have led to violations of Medicaid’s equal access provision. For 
example, one study found that of office-based primary care 
physicians only 65% were accepting new Medicaid patients, 
compared to 74% for Medicare and 88% for privately insured 
patients.55 Another study found that in states with the lowest 
provider payment rates, only about half of primary care pedia-
tricians are willing to serve Medicaid patients who request 
care.56
Unfortunately, the adverse impact of low Medicaid provid-
er payments has been further exacerbated by the economic cri-
sis.
  
57 The recession left millions of individuals without jobs and, 
as a result, without their accompanying employer-based health 
insurance.58 With few if any other options, many individuals 
turned to Medicaid for access to health care.59 As a result, Med-
icaid enrollment has risen considerably since 2008.60
In 2009, the federal government stepped in to provide 
states with extra federal matching funds to help cover Medicaid 
cost increases resulting from the large number of new enrol-
  
 
 53. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2006) (requiring that payments for 
covered care and services “are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality 
of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services 
are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services 
are available to the general population in the geographic area”). 
 54. See Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medi-
caid Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,342, 26,343 (proposed May 6, 2011) (to be codi-
fied at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447) (describing how some states are lowering payments 
in difficult fiscal times). 
 55. MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT, supra note 49, at 132. 
 56. Berman et al., supra note 49, at 243. 
 57. See Phil Galewitz, State Medicaid Spending Skyrockets, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2011/ 
october/27/state-medicaid-spending-increase.aspx (describing how states will 
have to make up for the end of stimulus money). 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. See id. (finding that Medicaid enrollment grew by 3% in 2008, 7.8% in 
2009, and 7.2% in 2010). Between June 2010 and June 2011, an additional 2.2 
million people enrolled in the Medicaid program (a 4.4% growth rate). KAISER 
COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID AND 
MANAGED CARE: KEY DATA, MEDICAID ENROLLMENT: JUNE 2011 DATA SNAP-
SHOT 1 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8050-05.pdf.  
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lees.61 That subsidy ended in June of 2011.62 With the end of in-
creased federal Medicaid matching funds and the ongoing eco-
nomic instability, many states have been left with significant 
budget shortfalls.63
Unfortunately, Medicaid has become a primary target of 
many state budget-cutting measures further exacerbating the 
problem of low provider payment rates.
  
64 Federal law currently 
limits states’ authority to cut back Medicaid enrollment.65 Con-
sequently, reducing provider reimbursement rates is seen as 
one of the main ways to reduce Medicaid costs and save state 
dollars.66 In 2012, forty-five states reduced provider payment 
rates and forty-two states plan on further cuts in 2013.67
C. ENFORCEMENT OF MEDICAID’S EQUAL ACCESS PROVISION 
  
The Medicaid Act does not promulgate specific administra-
tive procedures allowing Medicaid beneficiaries or providers to 
enforce the equal access provision through administrative ac-
tion.68
 
 61. See Galewitz, supra note 
 As a result, both Medicaid beneficiaries and providers re-
ly on judicial enforcement via lawsuits brought against state 
57 (stating that federal stimulus funds pro-
vided states with an additional $87 billion in federal funding for Medicaid).  
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. (stating that forty-six states plan on lowering provider pay-
ments); see also N.C. Aizenman, State Spending on Medicaid up Sharply, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health 
-science/state-spending-on-medicaid-up-sharply/2011/10/27/gIQAxbjSNM_ 
story.html (stating that many states have “turned to tough measures to trim 
Medicaid costs, such as . . . reducing payment rates to doctors and hospitals”); 
Tami Luhby, Medicaid Costs Balloon for Cash-Strapped States, CNN MONEY 
(Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.money.cnn.com/2011/10/27/news/economy/ 
Medicaid_state_spending/index.htm (arguing that states “have aggressively 
been trying to reduce their Medicaid costs . . . especially since the stimulus 
and health care reform acts restricted them from cutting enrollment”). 
 65. The 2010 health law contains a “maintenance of effort” provision, 
which bars states from tightening their eligibility rules for Medicaid through 
2014, when Medicaid will be expanded to cover currently ineligible individuals 
mainly at the federal government’s expense. Aizenman, supra note 64. 
 66. Galewitz, supra note 57; see also Luhby, supra note 64 (stating that 
slashing provider payment rates has been the most common strategy to reduce 
Medicaid costs). 
 67. VERNON K. SMITH ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNIN-
SURED, MEDICAID TODAY; PREPARING FOR TOMORROW: A LOOK AT STATE 
MEDICAID PROGRAM SPENDING, ENROLLMENT AND POLICY TRENDS 7 (2012), 
available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8380.pdf (referring to fiscal 
years 2012 and 2013). 
 68. Jessee, supra note 48, at 799.  
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Medicaid agencies as the provision’s main enforcement mecha-
nism.69
Prior to 2002, Medicaid providers and patients relied on 
§ 1983 of the Civil Rights Act to enforce Medicaid’s equal access 
provision.
 
70 Section 1983 allows citizens to bring private rights 
of action against state officials in order to enforce constitutional 
and federal statutory rights.71 In the 1980 case Maine v. 
Thiboutot, the Supreme Court held that in addition to protect-
ing constitutional rights, § 1983 also protects federal statutory 
rights.72 As a result of this holding, a plaintiff could invoke 
§ 1983 to seek redress for a violation of a statutory right con-
ferred by a federal statute which does not otherwise include a 
private right of action, like the Medicaid Act.73
Following the Supreme Court’s holding that federal stat-
utes can create enforceable rights under § 1983, in 1990 the 
Court found that the Medicaid Act created an individual feder-
al right enforceable under § 1983.
 
74
 
 69. See Moncrieff, supra note 
 In Wilder v. Virginia Hospi-
tal Ass’n, the Court held that the Boren Amendment conferred 
13, at 677 (explaining that in attempts to 
enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision, providers and patients have sued 
state health agencies, claiming that state-set rates are legally insufficient). 
 70. See ALAN E. SCHABES ET AL., HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK § 6:7 (2006) 
(explaining that in 2002 the Supreme Court modified other requirements for 
stating a cause of action under § 1983); Jessee, supra note 48, at 799–802 (ex-
plaining Supreme Court guidelines for enforcing a statutory right under 
§ 1983). 
 71. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1596 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Maine 
v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every 
person who, under color of any [state] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person . . . to the dep-
rivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable . . . .” (emphasis added)); Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4 
(finding that the phrase “and laws,” suggests that the § 1983 remedy broadly 
encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law).  
 72. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1596 (citing Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4). 
 73. Id. (citing Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 5). The Supreme Court later clarified 
the test for determining whether a particular statutory provision gives rise to 
a federal right enforceable via § 1983. In Blessing v. Freestone, the Court held 
that to successfully enforce a federally conferred statutory right a plaintiff 
must show that: (1) Congress intended the provision in question to benefit the 
plaintiff; (2) the statutory right asserted is not “so vague and amorphous that 
its enforcement would strain judicial competence;” and (3) the statute unam-
biguously imposes a binding obligation on the state in “mandatory rather than 
precatory terms.” Id. at 1596–97 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 
340–41 (1997)). 
 74. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509–10 (1990). 
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on Medicaid providers a right to “reasonable and adequate” re-
imbursement rates.75
After the Court’s finding in Wilder, Medicaid providers and 
recipients across the country initiated suits under § 1983 to en-
force various provisions of the Medicaid Act, including the 
equal access provision.
  
76 In some cases, equal access suits 
brought by Medicaid recipients and providers pursuant to 
§ 1983 were successful in preventing state Medicaid programs 
from reducing provider reimbursement rates.77 For example, 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a reduction in 
provider reimbursement rates by Arkansas’s Medicaid program 
violated the equal access provision because the impact of the 
20% rate reduction on access, economy, efficiency, and quality 
of care had not been considered.78
However, in 2002 the Supreme Court adjusted the re-
quirements for stating a cause of action under § 1983, severely 
limiting the ability of Medicaid providers and beneficiaries to 
bring an equal access claim against the state by way of 
§ 1983.
 
79 In Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Court disallowed a 
§ 1983 claim brought under Spending Clause legislation, find-
ing that the legislation did not create the type of individual 
right enforceable under § 1983.80 The Court held that only un-
ambiguously conferred “rights, not . . . broader or vaguer ‘bene-
fits’ or ‘interests,’” are enforceable under § 1983.81
Following the Court’s decision in Gonzaga, federal courts 
have generally accepted § 1983 claims brought pursuant to 
provisions within the Medicaid Act that reference “individuals” 
  
 
 75. Id. at 512. The Boren Amendment has since been repealed. See supra 
notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
 76. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1598; id. at 1598 n.109 (citing Visiting 
Nurse Ass’n of N. Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 1005 (1st Cir. 1996); 
Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 1996); Ark. 
Med. Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 527–28 (8th Cir. 1993)). 
 77. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1598 n.110 (citing Reynolds, in which the 
court found that Arkansas’s reduction in provider payments violated the equal 
access provision and comparing it to the decision in Sullivan, in which the 
court held that Indiana’s Medicaid program did not violate the equal access 
provision in setting reimbursement rates). 
 78. Id.  
 79. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282–83 (2002) (adjusting the first 
prong of the Blessing test to require an “unambiguously conferred” right to 
bring a § 1983 claim). See Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1599–1600 for a more 
comprehensive analysis of the Gonzaga decision. 
 80. 536 U.S. at 276; see also, SCHABES ET AL., supra note 70. 
 81. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283. 
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or “families,”82 and rejected § 1983 claims brought to enforce 
provisions containing broader, more generalized language.83 
This has created a split among the federal circuits as to wheth-
er the language of the equal access provision confers individual 
rights on Medicaid beneficiaries enforceable under § 1983.84 As 
a result, beneficiaries in many states are left without legal re-
course in the case of Medicaid equal access violations.85 In addi-
tion, since 2002, every federal circuit court that has considered 
a § 1983 equal access claim brought by providers has held that 
the language of the equal access provision does not confer indi-
vidual rights on Medicaid providers.86
Due to the erosion of private rights of action under § 1983, 
some Medicaid beneficiaries and providers have turned to the 
Supremacy Clause to provide an alternative cause of action in 
pursuing judicial enforcement of Medicaid’s equal access provi-
sion.
 Consequently, enforce-
ment of the equal access provision under a § 1983 cause of ac-
tion is constructively prohibited for providers.  
87 Under the Supremacy Clause’s preemption doctrine, 
state laws are deemed invalid if they are contrary to or inter-
fere with federal law.88
 
 82. Guiltinan, supra note 
 In the 2008 Ninth Circuit case Inde-
16, at 1599 & n.120 (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2006); Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 
2006); S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 603 (5th Cir. 2004); Sabree 
ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 2004)).  
 83. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1599–1600; id. at 1599 n.121 (citing 
Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 703 (5th Cir. 2007); 
Mandy R. ex rel. Mr. & Mrs. R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1148 (10th Cir. 2006); 
Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 542–43 (6th Cir. 2006); Sanchez 
v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005); Long Term Care Pharmacy 
Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 58–59 (1st Cir. 2004)).  
 84. Compare supra note 83 and cases cited, with Bontrager v. Ind. Family 
& Soc. Servs. Admin., 697 F.3d 604, 607 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that the 
plaintiff could bring a § 1983 claim based on rights in § 1396a(a)(10(A) of the 
Medicaid Act), and Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human 
Servs., 443 F.3d 1005, 1015–16 (8th Cir. 2006) (same), vacated on other 
grounds sub nom. Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 551 U.S. 1142, 1142 
(2007).  
 85. See supra note 83. 
 86. See Bradley J. Sayles, Preemption or Bust: A Review of the Recent 
Trends in Medicaid Preemption Actions, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
120, 130–31 (2010) (examining the evolution of equal access claims under a 
§ 1983 cause of action post-Gonzaga); see also, e.g., sources cited supra note 83. 
 87. SCHABES ET AL., supra note 70, § 6:7. 
 88. See U.S. CONST. art. VI; Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962) (“The 
relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a 
conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution provided 
that the federal law must prevail.”). 
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pendent Living Center of Southern California, Inc. v. Shewry, 
Medicaid providers and beneficiaries successfully argued that 
Medicaid’s equal access provision could be enforced through an 
implied cause of action under the Supremacy Clause.89 The suit 
was a result of the passage of several laws by the California 
Legislature reducing Medicaid provider payment rates.90 Medi-
caid providers and beneficiaries challenged the rate reductions, 
arguing that the cuts violated—and were thus preempted by—
Medicaid’s equal access provision.91 In upholding the plaintiff’s 
preemption claim, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the state 
Medicaid Director did in fact violate the federal Medicaid equal 
access provision when he implemented rate reductions man-
dated by the state legislature.92
However, the Supremacy Clause basis for judicial enforce-
ment of the equal access provision may be in jeopardy. In Jan-
uary of 2011, the Supreme Court granted the Independent Liv-
ing defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari.
 
93 In a 5-4 decision 
issued in February of 2012, the Court declined to resolve the 
question of whether Medicaid providers and beneficiaries stat-
ed a valid cause of action under the Supremacy Clause.94 The 
Court, finding that actions taken by the State since the suit 
was filed changed the facts of the case, vacated the judgment 
and remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.95
 
 89. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1047, 1048–49 
(9th Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Indep. Living Ctr. I] (holding that a plaintiff may 
bring suit under the Supremacy Clause “regardless of whether the federal 
statute at issue confers an express ‘right’”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 
(2009), on remand to No. CV 08-3315, 2008 WL 3891211 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 
2008), aff’d sub nom. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 
F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009) [hereinafter Indep. Living Ctr. II], motion to vacate 
denied, 590 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 Should the Court eventually find that the Supremacy 
 90. Robert Pear, Administration Opposes Challenges to Medicaid Cuts, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/29/us/29medicaid 
.html. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Indep. Living Ctr. II, 572 F.3d at 648, 625. 
 93. Maxwell-Jolly v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 590 F.3d 725 (9th 
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3500 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2011) (No. 09-958). 
 94. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1211–12 
(2012). 
 95. Id. Since the case was filed, the federal government approved some 
elements of California’s proposed rate changes. California also withdrew other 
proposed rate changes being challenged in the case. See Jason Millman, 
SCOTUS Punts on California Medicaid Suit, POLITICO (Feb. 22, 2012, 11:20 
AM), http://politico.com/news/stories/0212/73165.html. As a result of these ac-
tions, on remand, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Plaintiff’s Supremacy Clause 
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Clause does not provide a valid cause of action, many Medicaid 
providers and beneficiaries will again be unable to enforce Med-
icaid’s equal access provision through legal action. 
II.  INADEQUACY OF THE CURRENT JUDICIAL 
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM   
While the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on wheth-
er Medicaid beneficiaries and providers are able to enforce 
Medicaid’s equal access provision through § 198396 or under the 
Supremacy Clause,97
A. INTERPRETING THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS OF MEDICAID’S 
EQUAL ACCESS PROVISION: INCONSISTENT CIRCUIT RULINGS 
 there are a number of factors that suggest 
that the current judicial enforcement mechanism is not a suit-
able instrument for addressing equal access violations. This 
Part first explores the inconsistent circuit rulings interpreting 
the legal requirements of Medicaid’s equal access provision. 
Then, it examines the inconsistent court rulings concerning 
whether Medicaid beneficiaries or providers are even able to 
bring a Medicaid equal access suit. Finally, this Part concludes 
that even if the Supreme Court upholds judicial enforcement of 
Medicaid’s equal access provision through a § 1983 cause of ac-
tion or under the Supremacy Clause, judicial enforcement does 
not comport with congressional intent, federal administrative 
interpretation, or practical, economic and ethical considera-
tions. 
At present, the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits allow 
Medicaid beneficiaries to bring private rights of action in order 
to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision98
 
claim, finding that “[p]laintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their 
Supremacy Clause claims against the Director because—even assuming that 
the Supremacy Clause provides a private right of action—the Secretary has 
reasonably determined that the State’s reimbursement rates comply with 
§ 30(A).” Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 705 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 
2012). On January 29, 2013, Plaintiffs submitted a petition for rehearing and 
rehearing en banc. Joint Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 1, 
Sebelius, 705 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 12-55067), available at http://www 
.cmanet.org/files/assets/news/2013/01/petition-for-rehearing-.pdf.  
 while the Ninth 
 96. See Bontrager v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 697 F.3d 604, 607 
(7th Cir. 2012). 
 97. See Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1211–12. 
 98. See Bontrager v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 697 F.3d 604, 607 
(7th Cir. 2012); Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 
443 F.3d 1005, 1015–16 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated on other grounds sub nom. 
Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 551 U.S. 1142, 1142 (2007); Pa. Phar-
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Circuit allowed plaintiffs to bring suit for injunctive relief un-
der the Supremacy Clause.99 However, judicial enforcement has 
resulted in inconsistent rulings on what the equal access provi-
sion actually requires.100 As a consequence, states have been 
left without clear and consistent guidelines, creating a high de-
gree of uncertainty for states attempting to adjust their provid-
er payment rates.101
States in the Ninth Circuit are required to satisfy specific 
procedural requirements before setting Medicaid reimburse-
ment rates.
 
102 The Ninth Circuit has determined compliance 
with Medicaid’s equal access provision based solely on the 
state’s rate-setting procedures.103 In Orthopaedic Hospital v. 
Belshe, several hospitals brought legal action against California 
alleging that it violated Medicaid’s equal access provision when 
it lowered Medicaid hospital reimbursement rates.104 The court 
held that the equal access provision requires state agencies to 
set payment rates that “bear a reasonable relationship” to pro-
vider costs, based on “responsible cost studies, its own or oth-
ers’, that provide reliable data as basis for its rate setting.”105
 
macists Ass’n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 543–44 (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc). The 
First, Second, and Fourth Circuits have not directly addressed whether Medi-
caid beneficiaries are allowed to bring private rights of action under Medi-
caid’s equal access provision.  
 
Finding that the state failed to meet these requirements, the 
court remanded the case, holding that the state should “under-
take responsible cost studies that will provide reliable data as 
to the hospitals’ costs . . . . [and] then set rates that have some 
reasonable relation to such costs, [with] the state bearing the 
 99. See Indep. Living Ctr. I, 543 F.3d 1047, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2008); cf. 
Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1051 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that Medi-
caid’s equal access provision does not create an individual right enforceable 
under § 1983 by Medicaid beneficiaries or providers). 
 100. See generally Moncrieff, supra note 13 (providing an in-depth discus-
sion of the circuit split). 
 101. See Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medi-
caid Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,342, 25,343 (proposed May 6, 2011) (to be codi-
fied at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447). 
 102. See Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(requiring states to base rate changes on “reliable data” provided by “responsi-
ble cost studies”).  
 103. Moncrieff, supra note 13, at 688. 
 104. Orthopaedic Hosp., 103 F.3d at 1492. 
 105. Id. at 1496, 1500. This ruling was reaffirmed by the Ninth Circuit af-
ter the repeal of the Boren Amendment. See Independent Living Ctr. II, 572 
F.3d 644, 645 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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burden of justifying any rate that substantially deviates from 
such determined costs.”106
The Third and Eighth Circuits on the other hand, require 
states to engage in some kind of decision-making process, but 
do not go as far as the Ninth Circuit in laying out strict proce-
dural requirements.
 
107 In considering a challenge to a state’s 
decision to cut pharmacy reimbursement rates, the Third Cir-
cuit rejected the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the equal 
access provision requires states to base rate changes on reliable 
data provide by responsible cost studies.108 Instead, the court 
employed a more deferential interpretation, holding that the 
state “may not act arbitrarily and capriciously” in setting reim-
bursement rates by showing it “made a reasonable effort to an-
ticipate the effects of its action.”109 Applying this more deferen-
tial equal access interpretation, the court found that although 
the state “might have done a better job in its review by consid-
ering systematically and thoroughly all the implications of its 
rate revisions,” the deficiencies in the agency’s decision-making 
did “not make the overall process arbitrary and capricious.”110 
Consequently, courts in the Third and Eighth Circuits will de-
fer to a state’s reimbursement rate-setting decision if the state 
can show that it made a rational decision based on the consid-
eration of relevant factors, whatever those factors may be.111
 
 106. Orthopaedic Hosp., 103 F.3d at 1500. 
  
 107. See Moncrieff, supra note 13, at 698–99 (discussing the Third and 
Eighth Circuits’ arbitrary and capricious review in Medicaid equal access cas-
es). 
 108. Rite Aid of Pa., Inc. v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 851–53 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(noting the lack of procedural requirements in § 1396a(a)(30)(A) as compared 
to the repealed Boren Amendment). 
 109. Id. at 852–55. 
 110. Id. at 854–55. 
 111. For a more extensive discussion of the Third and Eighth Circuit pro-
cedural requirements, see Moncrieff, supra note 13, at 698–99. As noted by 
Abigail Moncrieff, in Rite Aid, the Third Circuit laid out specific relevant fac-
tors in finding the state’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious including: 
consideration of “private payer’s rates, neighboring state’s rates, and pharma-
ceutical companies’ prices.” Id. (citing Rite Aid, 171 F.3d at 848). However, in 
applying the arbitrary and capricious standard in Reynolds, the Eighth Circuit 
only referred to general factors such as efficiency, economy, quality and access. 
See id. (citing Ark. Med. Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 530–31 (8th Cir. 
1993)). In addition, the Reynolds court did not state whether consideration of 
all or just some of these factors was necessary. See id. Rather, the Reynolds 
court simply stated that reimbursement decisions based exclusively on budg-
etary considerations were insufficient. See id. 
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Unlike the more lenient procedural requirements set forth 
by the Third and Eighth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit does not 
require states to engage in any comprehensive procedural pro-
cess before reducing provider payment rates.112 In Methodist 
Hospitals, Inc. v. Sullivan, physicians and hospitals brought an 
action against state officials seeking to enjoin implementation 
of the state’s new rules affecting Medicaid reimbursement for 
outpatient and physician services.113 The plaintiffs argued that 
the state violated Medicaid’s equal access provision by failing to 
conduct adequate studies prior to changing the reimbursement 
plan.114 In the end, the court held that the Medicaid equal ac-
cess provision did not require the state to conduct studies in 
advance of the changes.115 As a result, states in the Seventh 
Circuit are not required to conduct studies or “employ any par-
ticular methodology” before setting reimbursement rates.116
As a result of these confusing and inconsistent rulings re-
garding the legal requirements of Medicaid’s equal access pro-
vision, states have been left with a lack of uniform standards to 
guide their rate-setting process. This has created a two-tiered 
rate-setting system, neither of which accomplishes the provi-
sion’s goal of ensuring equal access. Some states may feel en-
tirely free to reduce provider rates because they may cut rates 
without conducting prior cost studies or engaging in other pro-
cedural requirements.
  
117 This has led some states to cut provid-
er rates without considering the impact on access to care.118 
Other states, however, may be unwilling to consider any rea-
sonable reductions in provider rates due to concerns that any 
impact on access to care may violate Medicaid’s equal access 
provision.119
 
 112. See id. at 679 (providing a more in-depth analysis of the Court’s hold-
ing in Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 
 113. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 91 F.3d at 1027–28. 
 114. Id. at 1029–30. 
 115. Id. at 1030–31. 
 116. Id. 
 117. For example, states in the Seventh Circuit, where there is no re-
quirement for prior cost studies or other procedural requirements, may cut 
provider rates with relatively few procedural barriers. See supra text accom-
panying notes 112–116. 
 118. See supra notes 10–12, 54–67 and accompanying text. 
 119. For example, states in the Ninth Circuit are required to set provider 
payment rates that “bear a reasonable relationship” to provider costs, based on 
“responsible cost studies, its own or others’, that provide reliable data as basis 
for its rate setting.” See supra notes 102–09 and accompanying text.  
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B. ENFORCING MEDICAID’S EQUAL ACCESS PROVISION UNDER 
§ 1983 AND THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE: INCONSISTENT COURT 
RULINGS 
In addition to uncertainty regarding how courts will inter-
pret the requirements of Medicaid’s equal access provision, 
there is also uncertainty concerning whether Medicaid benefi-
ciaries or providers are able to bring a Medicaid equal access 
suit in the first place.  
As previously noted, the path to enforcement of Medicaid’s 
equal access provision through private suits has slowly eroded 
over the past ten years.120 Following the Supreme Court’s 2002 
decision in Gonzaga,121 every federal circuit court to consider a 
§ 1983 equal access claim brought by providers has held that 
Medicaid’s equal access provision does not confer individual 
rights on providers.122 For Medicaid recipients, the current judi-
cial enforcement mechanism has resulted in inconsistent court 
rulings regarding whether Medicaid beneficiaries may bring 
§ 1983 equal access suits. Thus far, the Supreme Court has de-
clined to resolve this issue.123 As a result, some Medicaid pro-
viders and beneficiaries have turned to preemption claims in a 
last ditch effort to judicially enforce equal access.124
The 2008 Independent Living case was the first case to 
suggest that Medicaid beneficiaries and providers can employ 
the Supremacy Clause to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provi-
sion.
 However, 
as with § 1983 claims, it remains unclear whether Medicaid 
providers and beneficiaries have a cause of action on the Su-
premacy Clause.  
125 The U.S. District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia initially rejected the plaintiff’s argument that it had a 
cause of action under the Supremacy Clause.126
 
 120. See supra Part I.C. 
 After appealing 
to the Ninth Circuit, the court remanded the case holding that 
a plaintiff could bring a preemption claim to enforce Medicaid’s 
 121. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
 122. See supra notes 83–86. 
 123. See Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 443 
F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1205 (2007).  
 124. See supra notes 87–92. 
 125. See Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, No. CV 08-3315, 2008 
WL 4298223, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2008). 
 126. Id. at *4–5. 
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equal access provision.127 The state appealed all the way to the 
U.S. Supreme Court.128
As noted above, the five-Justice majority declined to decide 
the issue of whether Medicaid providers and beneficiaries can 
state a valid cause of action under the Supremacy Clause by al-
leging that a state law reducing provider reimbursement rates 
conflicts with Medicaid’s equal access provision.
  
129 However, the 
dissent filed by Chief Justice John Roberts, in which Justices 
Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Anthony Alito joined, 
criticized the majority for evading the question and made it 
clear that this “is not a proper role for the Supremacy 
Clause.”130
Consequently, even if Medicaid beneficiaries and providers 
are willing to bring suits under a cloud of uncertainty regard-
ing what standard the courts will apply in interpreting the re-
quirements of Medicaid’s equal access provision, many Medi-
caid beneficiaries and providers are still left wondering 
whether they have a cause of action to even initiate the case. 
 Therefore, although the Court has not directly ruled 
on the question whether the Supremacy Clause may be em-
ployed to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision, the opinion 
suggests that at least four Justices would respond with a re-
sounding “no.”  
C. APPROPRIATENESS OF JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT: OTHER 
CONSIDERATIONS 
There are number of other factors including congressional 
intent and federal administrative interpretation, as well as 
practical, economic, and ethical considerations that suggest 
that the current judicial enforcement mechanism is not a suit-
able instrument to address equal access violations. Should the 
Supreme Court allow Medicaid beneficiaries and/or providers to 
bring suit against the state in order to enforce Medicaid’s equal 
access provision, these factors must be considered.  
 
 127. See Indep. Living Ctr. I, 543 F.3d 1047, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 128. See id., opinion issued by, 543 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009), and on remand to No. CV 08-3315, 2008 WL 3891211 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. 
Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009), motion to vacate denied, 590 F.3d 
725 (9th Cir. 2009), and petition for cert. filed, 2009 WL 907846 (U.S. Apr. 1 
2009) (No. 08-1223). 
 129. See supra Part I.B. 
 130. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1213–14 
(2012). 
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1. Congressional Intent 
As noted earlier, the Boren Amendment governed states’ 
Medicaid payments to certain institutional care facilities.131 The 
Amendment’s language was similar to that of the equal access 
provision, requiring states to set institutional care provider re-
imbursement rates that were “reasonable and adequate” to 
cover the cost of “efficiently and economically operated facili-
ties.”132 In 1990, the Supreme Court held that the Boren 
Amendment created a private right of action enforceable under 
§ 1983.133 Following this ruling, federal circuit courts across the 
country held that Medicaid beneficiaries and providers could 
sue to enforce various provisions of the Medicaid Act under 
§ 1983.134
Legislative history suggests that Congress repealed the 
Boren Amendment with the express intent of reversing the Su-
preme Court’s 1990 holding in Wilder that the Boren Amend-
ment conferred an enforceable federal statutory right.
  
135 In a 
report from the House Committee on the Budget supporting the 
repeal of the Boren Amendment under the Balanced Budget 
Act, the Committee stated, “[i]t is the Committee’s intention 
that, following enactment of this Act, neither this nor any other 
provision of [42 U.S.C. § 1396a] will be interpreted as establish-
ing a cause of action for hospitals and nursing facilities relative 
to the adequacy of the rates they receive.”136 This suggests that 
by repealing the Boren Amendment, Congress intended to pre-
vent providers from bringing suit to regulate Medicaid reim-
bursement rates.137
2. Federal Administrative Interpretation  
 
In addition to congressional intent, federal administrative 
interpretation of the role Medicaid’s equal access provision 
plays within the joint federal-state Medicaid program also sug-
 
 131. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
 132. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1597 n.104 (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396a(a)(13)(A) (2006)). 
 133. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509–10 (1990). 
 134. See supra note 76. 
 135. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1598 (citing 104 H.R. REP. NO. 105-149, 
at 591 (1997)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-149, at 590–91 (“A number of Feder-
al courts have ruled that State systems failed to meet the test of ‘reasonable-
ness’ and some States have had to increase payments to these providers as a 
result of these judicial interpretations.”). 
 136. Guiltinan, supra note 16, at 1598 n.112. 
 137. See id. at 1598. 
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gests that judicial enforcement is not an appropriate mecha-
nism to address equal access violations.  
In a brief filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of the 
Obama Administration, the federal administration officially 
took a stance against the use of § 1983 by Medicaid beneficiar-
ies or providers to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision.138 
The Obama Administration maintained that such lawsuits 
“would not be compatible” with the means of enforcement envi-
sioned by Congress, which relies on the Secretary of HHS to 
ensure compliance.139 The brief argued that determinations 
about how to measure a State’s compliance with general stand-
ards of economy, efficiency, quality of care, and sufficiency of 
payments to ensure access are “ones properly made by HHS 
through the exercise of its expert judgment and its bilateral re-
lationship with the State.”140 The Obama Administration also 
argued that the use of the Supremacy Clause to enforce Medi-
caid’s equal access provision was inappropriate:141
[Medicaid’s equal access provision] is a provision of a cooperative fed-
eral-state program enacted pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause 
authority, as to which Congress neither provided an express right of 
action for private parties nor conferred individually enforceable 
rights. Recognition of a nonstatutory cause of action for Medicaid pro-
viders and beneficiaries in this setting would be in tension with the 
nature of the federal-state relationship and the enforcement scheme 
contemplated by the statute.
 
142
Enforcement of Medicaid’s equal access provision through a 
private judicial enforcement mechanism flies directly in the 
face of the federal government’s interpretation of the role of 
Medicaid’s equal access provision within the statute’s broader 
federal-state Medicaid structure. 
 
3. Practical, Economic, and Ethical Considerations  
Finally, in addition to separation of powers concerns, prac-
tical, economic, and ethical considerations also suggest that ju-
dicial enforcement of Medicaid’s equal access provision is inap-
propriate.  
 
 138. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petition-
er, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (Nos. 09-
958, 09-1158, 10-283), 2011 WL 2132705. 
 139. See id. at *24–25. 
 140. Id. at *31. 
 141. Id. at *16–32. 
 142. Id. at *25. 
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a. Practical Considerations 
On a practical level, requiring individual low-income Medi-
caid beneficiaries to sue the state in order to ensure that they 
have access to needed health care providers is unrealistic. Most 
equal access suits have been brought by providers143 or by pro-
viders in association with Medicaid beneficiaries.144 This is like-
ly due to the inability of Medicaid beneficiaries to fund their 
own judicial enforcement actions.145 In order to qualify for Med-
icaid, individuals must have income and resources that total to 
a value less than a specified amount.146 Although income eligi-
bility levels vary by state and eligibility category (e.g., pregnant 
women, children, working individuals with disabilities, or low-
income Medicare beneficiaries), Medicaid assistance is limited 
to those in financial need.147 Equal access lawsuits have tradi-
tionally been brought by or in conjunction with financially 
equipped Medicaid providers.148
However, as stated earlier, following Gonzaga, every feder-
al circuit court that has considered a § 1983 equal access claim 
brought by providers has held that they do not have individual 
rights under Medicaid’s equal access provision.
 
149
 
 143. See, e.g., Visiting Nurse Ass’n of N. Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 
999 (1st Cir. 1996) (health care providers initiated action); Methodist Hosps., 
Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1027 (7th Cir. 1996) (physicians and hospitals 
brought action). 
 Enforcement 
of the equal access provision under a § 1983 cause of action is 
constructively prohibited for providers. As a result, Medicaid 
beneficiaries may no longer be able to rely on providers to fund 
equal access suits. 
 144. See, e.g., Indep. Living Ctr. I, 543 F.3d 1047, 1048–50 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(action brought by Medi-Cal providers and beneficiaries); Equal Access for El 
Paso v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 699–701 (5th Cir. 2007) (action brought by 
providers in association with Medicaid beneficiaries); Pediatric Specialty Care, 
Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005, 1009 (8th Cir. 2006) (action 
brought by providers and parents of three Medicaid recipients); Ark. Med. 
Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 1993) (action brought by Med-
icaid providers, professional associations, and beneficiaries). 
 145. See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 6–7 (noting that in order to 
qualify for Medicaid, individuals must meet income and resource eligibility 
requirements). 
 146. See id. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See cases cited supra notes 143–44. 
 149. See sources cited supra note 83; see also Sayles, supra note 86, at 130 
(“[E]ach court, when confronted with the issue, found that providers are not 
conferred rights under § 1396a(a)(30).”). 
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Even if the Supreme Court holds that providers may bring 
suit using a preemption claim, providers may be less likely to 
instigate action due to the limited relief available under the 
Supremacy Clause. Unlike § 1983 actions, plaintiffs cannot re-
ceive money damages or attorney fees in a suit brought under 
the Supremacy Clause.150 Plaintiffs may seek prospective in-
junctive and declaratory relief, but are prohibited from receiv-
ing relief for past violations.151
b. Economic Considerations 
 Due to the limited relief availa-
ble under the Supremacy Clause, providers may be less likely 
to initiate an equal access suit.  
On an economic level, requiring Medicaid beneficiaries and 
providers to bring suit in order to enforce Medicaid’s equal ac-
cess provision makes inefficient use of resources. Plaintiffs and 
judges are generally not experts on the Medicaid program.152 As 
a result, judicial enforcement of Medicaid’s equal access provi-
sion has led to the development and application of different le-
gal standards. As noted previously, the Ninth, Seventh, Third, 
and Eighth Circuits apply different legal standards when in-
terpreting the requirements of Medicaid’s equal access provi-
sion.153 Acknowledging this fact, the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found that Medicaid’s equal access provision was “ill-
suited to judicial remedy.”154 In coming to its holding, the court 
held that the interpretation and balancing of the provision’s ob-
jectives of “efficiency, economy, and quality of care . . . would 
involve making policy decisions for which [the] court has little 
expertise.”155
The federal government has advanced the argument that 
federal health officials are better equipped than judges to bal-
ance equal access concerns with other policy objectives.
 
156
 
 150. Guiltinan, supra note 
 In its 
brief submitted to the Supreme Court, the federal government 
argued that federal administrative process provides the neces-
sary “expertise, uniformity, widespread consultation, and re-
16, at 1620 (citing David Sloss, Constitutional 
Remedies for Statutory Violations, 89 IOWA L. REV. 355, 389 (2004)). 
 151. Id. 
 152. See Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 543 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(arguing that the judiciary is “ill-suited” to enforce Medicaid’s equal access 
provision). 
 153. See supra Part II.A. 
 154. Westside Mothers, 454 F.3d at 543. 
 155. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 156. See Pear, supra note 90. 
  
2344 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:2320 
 
sulting administrative guidance” that often accompanies agen-
cy decision-making.157
c. Ethical Considerations 
 For these reasons, federal health officials 
are better equipped to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision 
in a consistent and efficient manner. 
Finally, administration of Medicaid’s equal access provi-
sion through an enforcement system which is not uniform in its 
decision making and readily accessible to beneficiaries may be 
considered unethical by some.  
Congress enacted the Medicaid Act with the intent of lend-
ing a helping hand to many of the nation’s most needy individ-
uals.158 Subsequently, acknowledging the importance of provid-
ing not only health care coverage, but also meaningful access to 
care, Congress enacted the equal access provision.159
With financial and expert resources, the state and federal 
governments are better able to bear the burden of ensuring en-
forcement of the equal access provision.
 The goal of 
these congressional enactments was to lessen the hardships 
carried by our nation’s poorest and neediest citizens. Yet, con-
gressional intent may be compromised by placing the burden of 
equal access enforcement on those least able to bear it.  
160
III.  A FEDERAL REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT 
APPROACH   
 It is for this reason 
that a federal regulatory enforcement approach may be consid-
ered a more ethical and appropriate way to assure access to 
health care through oversight and enforcement of Medicaid’s 
equal access provision. 
As demonstrated throughout Part II, many factors suggest 
the need for an alternative equal access enforcement approach. 
This Note proposes implementation of robust federal regulatory 
 
 157. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
supra note 138, at *32 (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 292 
(2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment)). 
 158. See Moncrieff, supra note 13, at 675 (noting that enactment of the 
Medicaid Act was intended to provide many of the nation’s poor passage into 
the upper tier of the health care system). 
 159. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 160. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petition-
er, supra note 138, at *31–32 (arguing that unlike plaintiffs and judges, the 
federal government has the requisite expertise to address equal access viola-
tions); SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 6 (noting that Medicaid beneficiar-
ies are financially needy). 
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enforcement supported by adequate financial assistance as an 
alternative means by which to enforce Medicaid’s equal access 
provision. This Part first examines the current federal en-
forcement system and suggests support for a federal regulatory 
framework that promulgates clear and consistent guidelines for 
states to follow when setting reimbursement rates. Next, it ar-
gues that in order for states to accept and implement a com-
prehensive federally imposed equal access regulatory frame-
work, the system must be supported by sufficient financial 
assistance. Finally, it explains why the federal government has 
both the power and the duty to create a standardized federally 
based regulatory enforcement scheme.  
A. THE CURRENT FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM  
States must set their reimbursement policies in state Med-
icaid plans, and changes in those policies must be reflected in 
state-plan amendments (SPAs), which are then reviewed by 
HHS.161 When the federal government asks states to provide 
justification for the rate changes, they usually respond with a 
general statement assuring that access will not be affected.162 
When the government then asks for further details on the 
methodology used by the state in its determination, generally 
only a few states show that they relied on actual data in mak-
ing this determination.163 Absent actual data, the federal gov-
ernment generally relies on a state’s general assurances.164 As a 
result, states have been able to implement rate changes with 
relatively little fear that the federal government will reject 
their SPAs for violating Medicaid’s equal access provision.165
 
 161. See supra notes 
 To 
assure uniformity in the application of the Medicaid equal ac-
cess provision, the federal government must implement a more 
robust regulatory approach to the enforcement of this provi-
sion. 
25–29 and accompanying text. 
 162. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid 
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,343, 26,348 (proposed May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 
42 C.F.R. pt. 447). 
 163. Id. Additionally, of the states that actually rely on data, most focus 
“on historical levels of provider enrollment and their” substantively founda-
tionless “belief that providers would not disenroll based on a reduction in 
payment[].” Id. 
 164. See id. at 26,348–49 (“[W]e [HHS] have generally relied upon State 
assurances . . . to make decisions on proposed rate reduction SPAs.”). 
 165. The federal government has only rejected SPAs with proposed rate 
reductions in a few extreme instances. See id. at 26,349. 
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B. A ROBUST FEDERAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Under the Medicaid Act, the Secretary of HHS has broad 
authority to issue regulations “as may be necessary to the effi-
cient administration of the functions with which [she] is 
charged under [the Medicaid Act].”166 For example, the Secre-
tary has invoked this power to impose upper payment limits.167
1. Proposed Federal Enforcement Scheme 
 
The Secretary may also use this power to implement a robust 
federal regulatory framework to enforce Medicaid’s equal ac-
cess provision. 
Invoking this power in May 2011, the federal government 
through the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
proposed a rule that would create a standardized, transparent 
process for states to follow in assuring that provider payments 
are consistent with “efficiency, economy, and quality of care 
and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and 
services are available.”168 The proposed rule offers guidelines on 
data collection efforts and the public process that states must 
follow in order to demonstrate that the rate-setting process is 
consistent with the requirements of Medicaid’s equal access 
provision.169
Under the proposed rule, states would be required to sub-
mit equal access analyses based on data collected during the 
prior year along with any SPA that reduces or restructures 
provider payment rates.
 
170 CMS would then review these anal-
yses to make sure the state collected and analyzed all relevant 
data to ensure substantive compliance with equal access re-
quirements.171 While the sufficiency of this process is somewhat 
debated,172
 
 166. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 
 this regulatory proposal is a key starting point for 
25, at 136 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1302(a) 
(2006)). 
 167. See id. 
 168. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid 
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. at 26,342 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(30)(A)). As of April 
2013, nearly two years after it was first proposed, no action has been taken on 
the proposed rule.  
 169. Id. at 26,349. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id.  
 172. See, e.g., Joint Comments of Physician Organizations at 2–5, com-
menting on Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medi-
caid Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,342, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ 
resources/doc/washington/medicaid-access-review-sign-on-letter-05july2011 
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the creation of clear and consistent guidelines for state to follow 
in setting provider reimbursement rates in compliance with 
Medicaid’s equal access provision. 
2. Increased Federal Financial Assistance  
However, in order to create a uniform and transparent pro-
cess that is palatable to the states, a successful federal regula-
tory scheme should include increased federal financial assis-
tance to conduct the time- and resource-intensive equal access 
analyses.  
As stated previously, state participation in the Medicaid 
program is entirely optional.173 Until this point in time, every 
state has chosen to participate in the joint state-federal pro-
gram.174 However, challenged by strict federal requirements, 
potential expansion of Medicaid eligibility, and budget short-
falls, lawmakers in nearly a dozen states have stated that they 
are considering opting out of the Medicaid program altogeth-
er.175 They argue that states could provide more efficient and 
cost-effective care for children, individuals with disabilities and 
the impoverished by opting out of the Medicaid program and 
establishing a state-based health insurance system.176
Although it is debated whether opting out of the joint 
state-federal Medicaid program would be a viable option for 
states,
 
177
 
.pdf (questioning adequacy of data elements requirements, enforcement and 
oversight mechanisms, and exclusion of managed care). 
 should this happen, eligible beneficiaries in these 
states would no longer be protected under Medicaid’s equal ac-
cess provision. While implementation of a federal regulatory 
framework is an important first step to improving the enforce-
ment of Medicaid’s equal access provision, without the provi-
sion of additional financial assistance, states may view the fed-
eral government’s proposed equal access enforcement rule as 
the final incentive for their decision to opt out of the joint state-
federal program. 
 173. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 130. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See Emily Ramshaw & Marilyn Serafini, Battle Lines Drawn over 
Medicaid in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 
11/12/us/politics/12ttmedicaid.html (citing Republican lawmakers in Texas ar-
guing that strings attached to Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program are bankrupting the state). 
 176. Id. 
 177. See id. 
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One way to ease the administrative burden placed on 
states by the proposed federal rule would be to fully fund or, at 
a minimum, provide a higher federal administrative matching 
rate to conduct equal access analyses. The federal government 
matches administrative cost incurred by state Medicaid pro-
grams.178 Most types of allowable administrative costs are 
matched at 50%.179 However, state expenditures for certain 
types of administrative functions are matched at a higher rate 
of 75%.180 In addition, the federal government matches 90% of 
start-up expenses related to the operation of Medicaid infor-
mation management systems and state Medicaid fraud control 
units.181
In its proposed rule, CMS proposes that states have the 
ongoing responsibility to monitor access to care and conduct pe-
riodic reviews of compliance with Medicaid’s equal access pro-
vision.
 
182 Under an increased federal matching approach, the 
federal government could match state Medicaid programs at 
90% for administrative costs related to the start-up of Medicaid 
equal access monitoring and compliance management systems. 
Additionally, because some states may not have previously en-
gaged in many or any equal access reviews, the start-up phase 
could also include higher matching rates for initial equal access 
reviews investigating and resolving current violations. Once 
the initial equal access monitoring systems have been estab-
lished, the federal government could match state expenditures 
related to equal access data collection efforts at 75%.183
 
 178. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 
 The in-
25, at 144–45. Federal Medicaid fund-
ing comes from general revenues. APRIL GRADY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 
22849, MEDICAID FINANCING CRS-3 (2008), available at http://assets.opencrs 
.com/rpts/RS22849_20080326.pdf. 
 179. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 25, at 145. 
 180. Id. These administrative services include:  
[C]ompensation or training of physicians, nurses, and other skilled 
professional medical personnel used by the state Medicaid agency (or 
other state or local agencies) to administer the program; operation of 
a Medicaid management information system[]; surveys and certifica-
tion of nursing facilities; performance of medical and utilization re-
view or quality assurance by a Quality Improvement Organization . . . 
or External Quality Review Organization []; operation of state Medi-
caid fraud control units.  
Id.  
 181. Id. 
 182. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid 
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,342, 26,344 (proposed May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 
42 C.F.R. pt. 447). 
 183. See id. at 26,344–61 (requiring states to conduct these data collection 
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creased federal matching system would incentivize states to es-
tablish equal access compliance mechanisms and conduct ongo-
ing periodic reviews of compliance with Medicaid’s equal access 
provision. 
C. CHALLENGES TO A “FEDERAL” REGULATORY APPROACH 
In addition to concerns related to the administrative and 
financial burdens placed on states by a federal regulatory en-
forcement scheme, some states have also expressed concern 
with the federal government’s role in state Medicaid affairs. 
As noted previously, Medicaid is structured as a coopera-
tive federal-state program.184 Under the joint federal-state Med-
icaid system, states have broad flexibility to establish service 
delivery systems, “to design the procedures for enrolling pro-
viders . . . , and to set the methods for establishing provider 
payment rates.”185 Some opponents of a standardized federal 
regulatory approach argue that this structure is evidence of 
Congress’s intent for states to have broad flexibility to set pro-
vider rates.186 In addition, they argue that such flexibility is 
critical in order to allow review of beneficiary access to evolve 
over time, and for states to be able to implement effective and 
efficient approaches that are appropriate to their local and 
changing circumstances.187 Consequently, agencies and officials 
responsible for administering the Medicaid program in a num-
ber of states have taken a stance against the federal govern-
ment’s proposed rule contending that the federally-based equal 
enforcement scheme infringes upon the state’s broad discretion 
to set provider rates.188
However, the federal government has both the power and 
the duty under the Medicaid Act to issue regulations aimed at 
ensuring equal access to care. As noted above, the Secretary of 
HHS has the power to issue regulations necessary to efficiently 
 
 
efforts when the state proposes a rate change and on a regular periodic basis). 
 184. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 185. See Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medi-
caid Services, 76 Fed. Reg. at 26,343. 
 186. See Joint Comments of 17 States and State Medicaid Agencies, Com-
ments on the Medicaid Program: Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Med-
icaid Services, REGULATIONS.GOV (July 10, 2011), http://www.regulations 
.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2011-0062-0179 (follow “View Attachment” 
hyperlink). 
 187. See id. at 2. 
 188. See id. at 1–11. 
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administer the Medicaid program.189 In addition, the federal 
government also concedes that it has a “responsibility” under 
the Medicaid Act to ensure sufficient beneficiary access to cov-
ered services.190
Due to the lack of prior federal guidance on this issue, 
states have been able to make provider rate changes without 
considering the impact on access to care for Medicaid benefi-
ciaries.
 
191 This is due in part to the lack of guidance regarding 
the procedures that must be followed in complying with the re-
quirements of Medicaid’s equal access provision.192 Aware of the 
issues that have arisen due to the lack of federal guidance,193
Implementation of a robust federal regulatory enforcement 
approach is a necessary and important part of a successful 
equal access enforcement scheme. A federal regulatory scheme 
will help ensure equal access by providing states with clear and 
consistent guidelines to follow when setting reimbursement 
rates. However, it is imperative to provide ample financial sup-
port to make this federally centered regulatory approach palat-
able to cash-strapped states.  
 it 
is the duty of the federal government to create a uniform and 
transparent process for states to follow to ensure equal access. 
  CONCLUSION   
With over sixty million poor and disabled Americans rely-
ing on Medicaid to provide access to health care and millions 
more expected to join the ranks over the next few years,194
 
 189. See supra note 
 en-
suring that beneficiaries have meaningful access to health care 
providers is of utmost importance. However, if healthcare pro-
viders are unwilling to participate in the Medicaid program, 
many beneficiaries will be left without access to needed care. 
Acknowledging the importance of ensuring provider participa-
tion in the Medicaid program, Congress passed the equal access 
provision to ensure that states reimburse providers at a level 
166 and accompanying text.  
 190. See Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medi-
caid Services, 76 Fed. Reg. at 26,344. 
 191. Id. at 26,343; see supra notes 10–11, 54–56, 117–19 and accompanying 
text. 
 192. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text. 
 193. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid 
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,344 (acknowledging that issues have arisen due to 
the lack of federal guidance).  
 194. See MEDICAID PROGRAM AT A GLANCE, supra note 12; see also supra 
note 23 and accompanying text. 
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that ensures quality of care and sufficient provider participa-
tion. Nevertheless, with minimal oversight and fear of reprisal 
from the federal government, many states have reduced pro-
vider reimbursement rates, some in violation of Medicaid’s 
equal access provision. As a result, both Medicaid beneficiaries 
and providers have had to rely on judicial enforcement via pri-
vate suits brought against state Medicaid agencies to enforce 
Medicaid’s equal access provision.  
A number of factors including inconsistent circuit rulings 
interpreting the legal requirements of Medicaid’s equal access 
provision and conflicting rulings on whether Medicaid benefi-
ciaries or providers are able to bring a Medicaid equal access 
suit in the first place, coupled with a number of other pragmat-
ic and ethical considerations suggest that the current judicial 
enforcement mechanism is not an appropriate method by which 
to enforce Medicaid’s equal access provision. Implementation of 
a federal equal access regulatory approach that is supported by 
adequate federal financial support provides an alternative 
means by which to ensure equal access by creating the uniform 
and transparent enforcement mechanism needed to enforce 
Medicaid’s equal access provision in a practical, economic, and 
ethical manner. 
 
